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LAW AND MORALS
WILLIAM J. KENEALY, S.J.*

T HE

between law and morals is a prime problem of jurisprudence. It is a perennial problem in a dynamic society with its
constantly changing social, economic, technological and political conditions. It is a particularly difficult and delicate problem in our pluralistic
society in which large groups of citizens sincerely differ, theologically and
philosophically, about the morality of many institutions and actions,
and about the proper public policy of the state concerning them.
Americans were once divided on the legal and moral issues of human
slavery. We are now divided on the legal and moral issues of racial discrimination. We have been divided over the legal and moral rights of
capital and labor, over compulsory military service and thermonuclear
weapons, loyalty oaths and flag salutes, prize-fighting and gambling,
bible-reading and prayers in public schools, the equal treatment of children in private schools, the control of obscenity, the use of alcoholic
beverages, and many other legal-moral questions agitating our society.
Despite our shared reverence for the sanctity of human life, for the
sacredness of marriage, and for the holiness of the marriage act, the fact
is that Americans have been divided at various times over public policy
and laws respecting marriage and divorce, monogamy and polygamy,
fornication and adultery, prostitution and homosexuality, artificial insemination and contraception, sterilization and abortion, euthanasia and
suicide, capital punishment, the handling of poisonous snakes in religious
services, and even the denial of medical aid or blood transfusions to sick
or dying children.
Some of our differences have been satisfactorily solved in the past.
Surely others will be satisfactorily solved in the future. Possibly some
will never be solved to the satisfaction of all, but will merely be determined from time to time by majority vote. Nevertheless, the peace and
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LAW AND MORALS
good order of our society demand that we
sincerely strive to resolve our present differences, as best we can, with civil dialogue
and mutual respect, on sound legal and
moral principles.
All Americans desire a civil society and
a legal system founded upon principles of
morality. We know that there is a moral
order in the universe, within the range of
human understanding and the competence
of human virtue, distinguishing the good
from the evil - an objective moral order
which all civil societies and all voting majorities are bound in conscience to respect, and
upon which the peace, the liberty, and the
happiness of personal, national, and international life depend.
The moral order comes from God. It imposes upon us certain inalienable obligations, and bestows upon us certain inalienable rights, to enable us to cooperate in
peace and prosperity, to achieve our perfection, to attain our happiness, and thereby to
fulfill, in human dignity, our divine destiny.
These obligations and rights are inalienable
precisely because they are God-given. They
are not imposed or bestowed by the state
or by majority vote; wherefore they cannot
be abrograted or destroyed by the state or
by majority vote. They are antecedent, in
nature and in logic, to the institution of
governments, the ratification of constitutions, the enactment of statutes, or the casting of majority ballots. For governments
are instituted among men to recognize their
existence and to protect their exercise, to
foster and facilitate their enjoyment, by the
construction of practical codes of civil obligations and rights consonant with God's
moral order. This is the philosophy solemnly proclaimed by our Declaration of
Independence, which appealed to God, to
the Creator, to the Supreme Judge of the

World, and committed our young nation to
His Divine Providence.
The civil order depends upon the moral
order. The good society cannot be organized
upon police power alone. Law must rely
upon morals. For it is morality which imposes the obligation in conscience to obey.
civil law. Without this conscientious obligation, the enforcement of law, the administration of justice, and the preservation of
liberty would be impossible. It is an obvious
fact of human experience that the vast
majority of our people, in the vast majority
of their actions, habitually obey the law of
the land, not out of fear of legal sanctions,
but precisely because they realize that they
are morally bound to do so. The moral obligation to obey civil law is the indispensable
foundation of a decent and free civil society.
Law, therefore, must respect morals.
Man-made law cannot validly command the
violation of any God-given obligation, nor
can it validly prohibit the exercise of any
God-given right. Law must be just. An
unjust law cannot, of itself, bind the human
conscience. An unjust law is, in reality, no
law at all, but an act of governmental force
and a species of immoral violence. At various times and places men have been forced
to submit to immoral laws. In our own country the abomination of human slavery was
once enforced by law. But no man was ever
a slave in his own conscience. An immoral
law contradicts conscience. Conscience repudiates immoral law.
This is not to say, of course, that every
individual is sufficient unto himself to determine arbitrarily which laws he will obey and
which he will disregard. In cases of genuine
doubt, reason postulates a presumption that
civil laws, enacted under the safeguards of
constitutional processes, are consonant with
the moral order. Reason, as well as good
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order and respect for the conscientious convictions of others, requires that enacted civil
laws be given the benefit of doubt in the
midst of honest disagreement. Nevertheless,
a palpably immoral law cannot, of itself,
bind the human conscience. There is a moral
right to disregard it. There may be a moral
obligation to resist it. In the face of clear
and irreconcilable conflict between law and
morals, we must obey God rather than man.
The great body of American law is solidly
grounded upon morality. In God's Providence, the incorporation of sound moral
principles has been the most conspicuous
and vital factor in the development and
refinement of our common and constitutional law. An obvious example is seen in
the fundamental axiom of our criminal law
that, except for minor matters called public
welfare offenses, the overt act does not make
a criminal unless his mental state is criminal
- actus non tacit reum nisi mens sit rea,
which was a principle of moral theology
long before its adoption by our criminal
law. And similarly, with understandable
exceptions, the moral principle of personal
responsibility, based upon the moral premise of free will, now constitutes the foundation and determines the superstructure of
our entire criminal and civil law. The legality of our free society is essentially predicated upon morality.
The vital and refining influence of morals
upon our law is evident in the history of
equity; in the evolution of the law of contracts and of torts; in the development of
the law of theft, from larceny through embezzlement through false pretenses; in the
law of sales, from caveat emptor to decent
dealing; in the law of agency, from mere
authority to fiduciary obligations; in the law
of property, from raw power to social duties,
from laissez-faire rugged individualism to
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social responsibility; in the law of industrial
relations, from individual helplessness to
collective bargaining; in our constitutional
law, from slavery to freedom; in the law of
due process, from procedure to substance;
in the law of equal protection, from compulsory racial segregation to equal human dignity; and so with many other principles and
precepts of our common and constitutional
law.
But the moral order depends upon the
legal order also. Civil laws are necessary for
the recognition and preservation of morals
in organized society. Without the support
and sanction of law, many moral obligations
could not be fulfilled, and many moral rights
could not be protected against the encroachments of the unscrupulous and the machinations of the criminal. The law and the
police power of the state are necessary to
protect the vast majority of our people in
their fixed desire and their conscientious
obligation to observe the precepts of the
moral order.
Furthermore, the law must do more than
protect those obvious moral obligations and
rights upon which all men agree. It must do
more than enforce the immediately evident
principles of public morality about which
there is a general consensus. The law has
an educative as well as a coercive function.
It cannot escape the perplexing task of advancing from the immediately evident principles of public morality to the derivative
principles which depend upon mediate and
empirical evidence. The law is a practical
and progressive science. It must specify and
apply particular principles of public morality by enacting specific and particular rules
and standards which do not bask in the sunshine of universal agreement. The law must
frequently labor in the much dimmer light
of argument and controversy; sometimes,
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unfortunately, in the semi-darkness of strident partisanship and bitter emotionalism.
Yet, in light or in darkness, the law must
relentlessly pursue the public morality and
common good of society.
The construction and refinement of a
corpus juris properly implementing public
morality is a monumental and perpetual
task. It postulates moral sensitivity in public
opinion, dedicated objectivity in the legislative process, and scholarly wisdom in the
judicial process. For the principles of public
morality require reasonable and practical
specification and application to the constantly changing social, economic, technological and political conditions of our
dynamic and pluralistic civil society.
The necessity of applying the principles
of public morality postulates change in our
civil laws as the circumstances of our
society change. It repudiates a naive and
smug complacency in the status quo. It
commands a reasoned acceptance of the
good and a rejection of the evil in all that is
new. It demands a critical search for the
better. It requires an intensive scrutiny of
all the pertinent data of history, philosophy,
politics, economics, sociology, psychology,
medicine, and every other available font of
human knowledge, normative and empirical,
which might help to solve the perplexing
problems of our society. But of primary
importance, it insists that the search for a
better corpus juris be made in the light of
the origin, nature, purpose and limitations
of the state; and in the knowledge of the
origin, nature, dignity and destiny of man.
For the law is made for man, and man is
made for God.
Legality and morality are interrelated and
interdependent. But they are not the same
thing. Their respective fields overlap, but
they are not coextensive. Many criminal acts

are sins, many sinful acts are crimes, but
crime and sin are not identical. Certain
crimes, such as the so-called public welfare
offenses which penalize the overt act regardless of the mental element, can be committed without sin. Certain sins, such as
simple lying and solitary masturbation, can
be committed without crime. But lying
which involves fraud or libel, and masturbation which involves public indecency, are
both sins and crimes. They are crimes precisely because they offend against that aspect
of the common good which is properly
called public morality. It is not the purpose
or function of civil law to penalize or prohibit an immoral act simply because it is
immoral. The end of civil law is the common or public good of society. In the field
of morals, therefore, its proper scope is not
private morality, but public morality only.
It is not easy to delineate, with abstract
precision, the specific fields of public and
private morality. It is difficult to draw a
sharp line which will clearly and satisfactorily distinguish, in all cases, those moral
actions which properly fall within the legislative competence of the state, and those
which are properly beyond it. In such a task
reasonable men may differ, and their opinions may vary from time to time and from
culture to culture. The distinction is certainly not that between publicity and
secrecy. The publicized lie is not a crime.
The secret murder is. Although the field of
public morality is by no means confined to
criminal law, but extends to the great body
of our civil and constitutional law as indicated above, nevertheless it may be helpful
to approach an understanding of it by considering a number of obviously immoral
actions punished as crimes by the criminal
law of all mature and civilized states.
Murder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem,
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assault and battery violate personal rights of
life and bodily integrity; kidnaping and
false imprisonment violate personal rights of
liberty and locomotion; robbery, larceny,
embezzlement and false pretenses violate
personal rights of property; arson and burglary violate personal rights of habitation and
enclosure; libel violates personal rights of
reputation; perjury and bribery pervert the
administration of justice and obstruct the
preservation of liberty; commercialized vice
corrupts the citizenry and offends the public
decency; riots disrupt the public peace and
order; treason invades the security of government itself - which exists to protect the
personal rights and public values enumerated above.
The administration of justice, the preservation of liberty, the maintenance of peace
and order, the security of government, and
the protection of fundamental personal
rights constitute an obvious and important
part of the common good of civil society.
All immoral acts, therefore, which substantially militate against them are clearly in the
field of public morality, and properly subject
to state legislative power.
It is a misleading half-truth, therefore, to
say that the state cannot legislate morality.
The state can, should, and does in fact legislate in the field of public morality. Our
whole law is witness to the fact. But the
state should not, and usually cannot, legislate in the field of purely private morality.
It is obvious, of course, that the state is
utterly incompetent to legislate concerning
purely internal acts of virtue or of vice. Yet
purely internal acts of mind and heart comprise a large part of morality. Moreover, the
state should not attempt to legislate concerning overt moral acts which are in the
field of privatemorality only. The legislative
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competence of the state reaches only to
those overt moral acts which are properly
in the field of public morality.
The stability of the marriage bond, many
rights and obligations of the married, the
care of orphans and illegitimate children,
the rights of the unborn, the corruption of
youth, the spread of sexual promiscuity
and venereal disease, the growth of alcoholism and drug addiction, the fleecing of
the poor by gambling syndicates, and the
general condition of fundamental sociomoral standards, are matters which clearly
affect the public or common good of
society. For that reason they are properly
within the field of public morality, and
within the legitimate scope of law and public policy.
Nevertheless, as indicated above, the
states differ substantially in their laws and
public policies concerning marriage, divorce, separation, abortion, adoption, adultery, fornication, prostitution, homosexuality, artificial contraception, various
forms of gambling, the use of alcohol and
narcotics, and many similar matters. These
differences reflect disagreement on one or
more of three questions: (1) whether the
given activity is immoral or not; (2) if
immoral, whether it is in the field of private
or public morality; and (3) if in the field
of public morality, whether this or that
public law or policy is the proper and prudential way to handle the problem in view
of the primary consideration of the public
or common good of society.
Recently the State of Illinois has been
concerned with two such problems, namely,
legalized abortion and artificial contraception. It may be of interest to consider both
problems in the light of the general principles outlined above.
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Abortion
The proposed Illinois Code of 1961
recommended to the Legislature the legalization of abortion by a licensed physician
in a licensed hospital, provided:
"(1)

That the abortion is medically advisable because continuance of the pregnancy would endanger the life or
gravely impair the health of the pregnant woman; or
(2) That the abortion is medically advisable because the fetus would be born
with a grave and irremediable physical or mental defect; or
(3) The pregnancy of a woman has resulted from forcible rape or aggravated incest."

The proposed code would have legalized
abortion, therefore, for six different reasons. The Legislature rejected the last five
but approved the first reason, which had
been part of the old law of the state. Accordingly, the present Illinois Criminal
Code, which became effective January 1,
1962, legalizes abortion only when "necessary for the protection of the woman's life."
In evaluating the merits of the abortion
provisions of the proposed and the enacted
Illinois Code, a bit of history is pertinent.
In the early development of our common law, nobody knew for sure exactly
when individual human life commenced. It
was common knowledge, of course, that
the human fetus began to grow from the
moment of conception. Everyone knew,
therefore, that it was a living thing. But
when it began to live as a human being,
that is, with a human soul, was a matter of
conjecture, theory, doubt and dispute
among theologians, philosophers, biologists, physicians, judges, lawyers, legislators, and the general public.
Did human life begin at conception, at
quickening, at viability, or only at birth?

Some thought it probable or possible that
the fetus, at the moment of conception,
began to live with some sort of a vegetable
soul; that, after a considerable but indefinite
period of growth, it began to live with some
sort of an animal soul; that, after a further
and disputed period of development, it
eventually began to live with a human
soul; and thus, finally, became a human
being. But despite the conjectures, theories,
doubts and disputes, it was universally
conceded that the child born alive, however
immature and undeveloped compared with
the full-grown adult, was certainly a human
being; and therefore was certainly the subject of moral and legal rights.
A fundamental principle of criminal law
requires that all elements of a crime must
be proved beyond all reasonable doubt.
Since murder involved the killing of a being
certainly known to be human, the crime of
murder was restricted to the killing of a
human being after it had been born alive.
Abortion was made a lesser crime, as the
killing of a potential human being or a
being of doubtful humanity.
It remained for the biological and medical sciences to clear up the doubt. They
did so. Scientific evidence gradually established the fact that the human fetus grows
and develops internally from the moment of
conception, not by leaps and starts, but
evenly, steadily and purposefully to the
time of its birth, just as it continues its
even, steady and purposeful growth from
the immaturity of the baby to the maturity
of the adult. The ancient theories of different and successive souls were rendered
obsolete and discarded. The continuous
internal teleological development, from
conception to birth to adulthood, postulates
a human soul, and therefore a human being,
from the first moment of conception. There

9 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER

is no other rational explanation of the
scientific evidence. The human fetus is a
human being.
But jurisprudence is conservative. There
is usually a time lag, sometimes a tragic
one, between the advance of scientific
knowledge and the development of the law.
Nevertheless, the scientific evidence of the
humanity of the unborn child has had an
important impact upon the development of
our law. This impact is most evident in the
modern law of property and of torts.
At common law the unborn child could
not take a present legal estate by means of
a deed, because the required livery of seisin,
i.e., the technical transfer of possession by
manual delivery of a symbol thereof, was
obviously impossible. Moreover, it was
originally doubtful whether the unborn
child could take such an 6state by means
of a will or by descent, even though livery
of seisin was not involved in such cases.
As the law developed, however, the unborn
child became legally competent to take
such an estate by means of a will or by
descent, provided that the child had quickened in the womb before the death of the
testator or of the intestate ancestor. And
in modern property law, by judicial decision or statute, quickening is not required,
conception alone is sufficient. The unborn
child, quickened or not, viable or not, is
now competent to take a present legal
estate by will or by descent; and, in a few
states, by deed as well. Although the estate
vested in an unborn child is defeasible in
the event of death in the womb, the fact is
that modern property law provides that a
present legal estate can vest in the unborn
child from the moment of its conception.
This is a clear legal recognition of the
humanity of the unborn child, and a protection of its property rights, from the
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moment of its conception.
Originally, when a pregnant woman was
wrongfully injured, and as a result her subsequently-born child suffered deformity, the
law denied recovery to the child itself. Two
reasons were given: at first, doubt as to the
human existence of the child at the time of
the injury; and later, difficulty in proving
the causal connection between the pre-natal
injury and the post-natal deformity. The
doubt was dissipated by science. The difficulty was overcome by requiring clear and
sufficient medical evidence of the causal
connection. As a result modern tort law,
in many if not in most states, now allows
the child itself to recover for pre-natal
injuries. It has been held that a child born
alive may maintain an action for the wrongful death of its parent, caused before the
child's birth. And it has been held that an
action will lie for the wrongful death of a
child, born alive, who died later as a result
of pre-natal injuries. The development of
the law of torts is another clear legal recognition of the humanity of the unborn child,
and a protection of its right to life and
bodily integrity, from the moment of its
conception.
The advance of scientific knowledge
concerning the humanity of the unborn
child, and the utilization of that knowledge,
is less evident in the criminal law. Even in
criminal law, however, it has been held
that murder was committed where a child,
born alive, died later as a result of a malicious beating inflicted upon its pregnant
mother. In any event, an intelligent and
objective pursuit of truth and of justice
requires an approach to the modern problem of legalized abortion in the light of
the scientific evidence that the unborn
child is in fact a human being.
In The New Republic of February 9,
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1963, James Ridgeway wrote an article
entitled "One Million Abortions," and subtitled "It's Your Problem, Sweetheart." The
opening sentence reads, "Reform of the
state abortion laws is not a popular cause
even though these statutes result in extraordinary inhumanity when they are enforced,
and lead to spurious medical practice when
disregarded, as they commonly are." Mr.
Ridgeway argues for the "reform" of the
"anachronistic" and "archaic" abortion laws
which restrict legal abortions to cases in
which the life of the prospective mother is
allegedly in danger. This restriction bothers
him. He urges a "broader view of health."
He advocates the enactment of statutes
which, like the one proposed and rejected in
Illinois, would authorize abortions for several other reasons.
Mr. Ridgeway does not bother to point
out that the scientific researches of the
medical profession helped to dissipate the
anachronistic and archaic doubts of earlier
times as to the nature of the human fetus,
and to establish the modem empirical
evidence of the humanity of the unborn
child from the moment of conception. But
he seems angered by the opposition of the
medical profession to his "broader view of
health." He sees the profession "mired in
the 19th Century," practicing in "the Victorian era," - and preserving "its chaste
veneer." Presumably he thinks, or he thinks
that doctors think, that the killing of an
unborn child is a matter of chastity or unchastity! The notion is novel, at least. Immediately after disparaging the "chaste
veneer" of the medical profession in
America, Mr. Ridgeway continues:
Society has adopted a somewhat more
modern attitude toward abortion elsewhere
in the world. In most Eastern European
countries - which closely imitate the Soviet

Union-abortion is legal on request through
the third month of pregnancy, the safest
period in which to abort.... In Hungary
the number of abortions now exceeds the
number of live births.... Japan made abortion legal on request in 1948 for women
less than three months pregnant, for the
specific purpose of reducing the birth rate.
As a result the rate has been halved. An
estimated 1.7 million abortions are performed annually, slightly more than the 1.6
million births ....

The Scandinavian coun-

tries have adopted abortion practices less
restricted than those of the United States,
but far more limited in scope than either
those of Japan or East Europe ....

It seems

likely that the United States will move, albeit slowly, in the direction of the Scandinavian laws.
Mr. Ridgeway begins a paragraph, captioned "Sanctity for the Chaste," with the
observation that, "The opposition to abortion reform usually has less to do with religious dogma than with vaguely Puritanical
traditions which influence Protestants."
Quite apart from the tasteless sneer about
sanctity and chastity- virtues revered in all
religious traditions - the observation strikes
me as grossly unfair to Protestant principles
of morality. It is documented by wisecracks which fall somewhat short of intellectual argument.
Later in his article Mr. Ridgeway states
that, "There is little religious opposition to
abortion in Japan. Shinto, for example,
does not recognize the child as a living
person until it has seen the light of day."
Previously he had stated that, "Roman
Catholics regard abortion at any stage of
pregnancy as a form of murder: life begins
at the moment of conception." These two
statements would seem to indicate that the
author has heard of the basic moral problem
involved in abortion. But nowhere does he
discuss the merits of the basic moral ques-
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tions: Is the unborn child a living human
being? If so, does the unborn child have a
right to its life? If so, is its right to life
equal to that of other human beings? Yet,
without discussing the basic moral problem
in terms of the basic moral questions, Mr.
Ridgeway uses the term "reform" ten times
in his brief three-page article.
It is necessary, of course, to keep in mind
exactly what is contained in the concept of
abortion. The death of an unborn child,
which results from an otherwise proper and
necessary surgical operation upon a pregnant women, is unfortunate and regrettable.
But it is neither immoral nor illegal. Nor
is it an abortion. Abortion involves the
direct and intentional killing of an unborn
child. It means a purposive and deliberate
killing of a human being. It is the direct
and deliberate destruction of a human life
as a means to some such social end as the
six objectives proposed in Illinois in 1961;
or the single objective of preserving the life
of the mother, as enacted in the present
Illinois Criminal Code. Is such a killing ever
morally justified? Should it ever be legally
sanctioned?
Excluding unborn children for the moment, the direct and deliberate killing of
a human being is never justified in morals,
or sanctioned in law, because he is weak,
deformed, sick, senile or insane; or because
he is a physical, financial, emotional or social burden upon others. No civilized person would suggest that a child might be put
to death, morally or legally, because he was
born "with a grave and irremediable physical or mental defect;" or because he was
born after being conceived by "forcible rape
or aggravated incest." The very concept of
the direct and deliberate killing of a child
after its birth is contrary to civilized reason.
It is also revolting to civilized emotions.
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After birth, when the child is seen, heard,
touched and fondled, powerful and praiseworthy human emotions spontaneously arise
to reinforce the obvious dictates of human
reason. The child is precious. Its right to
life is sacred. The moral law vindicates it.
The civil law protects it.
Despite the nobility of the emotions
which properly surround the newborn child,
morality is discovered, and legality should
be determined, not by emotion, but by reason. But reason, premised upon scientific
evidence, concludes that the child is essentially the same human being before as after
its birth. The passage of birth adds nothing
to its essential nature. Reason indicates,
therefore, that the child has the same moral
right to life before as after its birth. For the
moral right to life emanates, not from the
event of birth, but from the nature of
human being. And the moral right of a
human being to its life is one of the fundamental rights which governments are
instituted to secure. Moreover, the civil law
should be especially solicitous and vigilant
to protect the lives of the unborn. For the
unborn constitute the most voteless, voiceless, helpless, unrepresented and unorganized minority in the land.
The direct and deliberate killing of a
human being is never morally justified except in legitimate warfare, legitimate execution for crime, legitimate prevention of
crime, or in legitimate defense of self or
others. But the unborn child is neither an
enemy nor a criminal. There remains only
the question of the legitimate defense of
self or others, specifically the pregnant
mother.
The civil law will not sanction the direct
and deliberate killing of an innocent human
being, after its birth, merely because such
a killing would save the life of the killer or
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of another. It is clearly murder, for instance,
directly and deliberately to kill an innocent
person when ordered to do so, even under
pain of one's own immediate death. This is
true regardless of the age, health, sex, character, or the personal, marital, financial, national, political, racial, religious or social
status, or any other differences between the
killer and the killed. All human beings are
essentially equal. One human life is fundamentally as sacred as another. No human
life is intrinsically inferior or subordinate to
another. This is what is meant by the moral
and legal principle of human equality.
Both morals and law, however, recognize
the right to kill an unjust aggressor, when
such action is genuinely necessary to defend
the life of an innocent human being. Moreover, for this right of defense to arise, it is
not necessary that the aggressor be formally
or consciously and responsibly unjust; it is
sufficient, for instance, if he is an insane
and irresponsible maniac whose activity
here and now gravely threatens the life of
an innocent person who cannot be protected except by the killing of such a materially unjust aggressor.
But even the materially unjust aggressor
must be an aggressor.And aggression must
consist at least in the exercise of some volitional or active force directed by the aggressor against the life to be defended. But
the unborn child directs no active or volitional force against the life of the pregnant
woman. The unborn child simply exists and
grows, passively and without volition, in the
womb of its mother. To say that it is an
aggressor, by reason of its physical existence and natural growth in the place intended for its existence and growth, is to do
violence to meaningful language. Even in
the supposition that the mother's life is in
danger, and that the death of the child is

the only available means to avoid that danger, the direct and deliberate killing of the
child in the womb can be predicated only
upon an essential and intrinsic inferiority
or subordination of the infant to the maternal right to life. Such a supposition involves
tremendous emotion. But reason supplies
no justification for killing the child to save
its mother, as it supplies no justification for
killing the mother to save her child. For all
human beings have an essentially and fundamentally equal right to life. And this
intrinsic equality is a basic principle of
morality, as it should be of legality.
The direct and deliberate killing of an
innocent human being, even as a means to
preserve the life of another human being,
is immoral. Moreover, since the state is
instituted to protect fundamental moral
rights, including the right to life, such a
killing is in the field of public immorality.
The civil law, therefore, should prohibit
abortion for any reason, in order to fulfill
its obligation to protect the fundamental
right to life of all the human beings within
its jurisdiction.
Artificial Contraception
Some months ago the Illinois Public Aid
Commission voted to adopt a public policy
of furnishing contraceptive devices and
services to recipients of public welfare relief. The policy was intended to apply to
all mothers on relief, whether married or
single, whether living alone or with their
husbands.
The announcement created a storm of
controversy. The policy found favor with
those who advocate population control by
means of artificial contraception. It appealed to those who believe there is a moral
right to contraceptive intercourse, which
should be enjoyed by the poor as well as
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the rich. It appealed to many tax-payers
who think that the burden of relief is too
heavy already, and who wish to lower their
taxes by cutting down the number of persons on relief. It also appealed to some people who consider that there are too many
Negroes in Cook County already, and who
desire to check the growing percentage of
Negroes in the Chicago area.
On the other hand it was argued that,
if public funds are to be expended for
contraceptive purposes, such expenditures
should be restricted to those women on relief who are living with their husbands, on
the ground that otherwise the policy would
encourage and support adultery and fornication, which are contrary to the public
policy of the state. Others opposed the proposed policy in its entirety, on the ground
that artificial contraception is immoral in
itself, and that its official encouragement
and support, by public authority and public
funds, would be an official policy of public
immorality.
A bill was introduced into the Illinois
Senate to limit the policy to women on relief living with their husbands. It was passed
by a wide margin. Then a similar bill was
introduced into the House of Representatives. But the Speaker of the House, in the
exercise of his large parliamentary powers,
refused to allow the bill to come to a vote.
A filibuster was threatened, and a compromise was finally reached. On June 28, 1963,
the House voted to establish a fifteenmember legislative commission to study the
entire question of public relief and artificial
contraception over a two-year period, and
to submit a report to the Illinois Legislature
in 1965. The commission will consist of
five Senators, five Representatives, and five
members of the public to be appointed by
the Governor. The Senate agreed to the
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establishment of the commission. At the
same time the Governor agreed that, pending the report of the commission in 1965,
the use of public funds for contraceptive
purposes will be restricted to married
women on relief living with their husbands.
Presumably, the entire policy will be decided by legislative action in 1965.
One of the unfortunate and distressing
aspects of the controversy during the past
several months was the rather frequent
accusation that those who opposed the use
of public funds for contraceptive purposes
were attempting "to force their particular
religion down the throats of others." The
charge was usually aimed at Catholics. It
was unfortunate because it did nothing to
clarify the intellectual issues. It was distressing because it tended to increase rather
than lessen religious tensions.
The accusation seemed to be based upon
the erroneous assumption that Catholic
belief concerning the immorality of artificial
contraception is the product of Church
legislation, rather than Church teaching
about the natural law-or possibly upon an
ignorance of this important distinction. The
accusation seemed to be grounded upon the
equally fallacious assumption that a Catholic's religious belief could not be in harmony
with his sincere conviction, based upon
philosophical and moral reasons, as to the
common good of civil society-or possibly
upon an ignorance of this critical distinction
also. Finally, the accusation seemed to ignore entirely the fundamental distinction
between private and public morality.
There are intellectual reasons which lead
me to conclude that artificial contraception
is morally wrong. I shall not indicate them
in this brief article. Suffice it to say that there
are theological arguments which lead me, as
(Continued on page 264)
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LAW AND MORALS
(Continued from page 210)
a Catholic, to that conclusion. There are
philosophical arguments which lead me, as
a citizen, to the same conclusion. But neither
my theological nor my philosophical arguments lead me to the further conclusion that,
simply because artificial contraception is
morally wrong, therefore it should be penalized or prohibited by the state. I do not
support the Connecticut law, for instance,
which makes the actual use of a contraceptive a crime. For reasons which I cannot
recount in this brief article, it seems to me
that the use of a contraceptive device is a
matter of private morality, and not of public
morality. It seems to me, therefore, to be
beyond the proper competence of the police
power of the state. I do not speak of laws
which would prevent the public display of
contraceptive devices in store windows or
shop counters under the eyes of teen-agers.
I speak of the use of a contraceptive device.
Nevertheless, the use of public agencies
and of public funds to encourage and support artificial contraception is surely a different, although a related, problem. When
public authority and public funds are employed to encourage and support contraception, it seems to me that we are confronted

with a question of public morality. All citizens have an interest in the common good
of society, and therefore in public morality.
This interest is not to be destroyed or ignored because of religious belief or unbelief.
Wherefore citizens with religious beliefs
should not be disenfranchised or silenced
because their religious beliefs coincide, in
whole or in part, with their sincere civic
convictions as to what is good for the society
in which they live. When the Baptist or
Methodist or anyone else urges legal restrictions upon the use of alcoholic beverages or gambling, and does so because he
sincerely believes that such restrictions are
necessary or good for the common welfare
of civil society, he exercises a right and
fulfills an obligation of citizenship. It would
be stupidity or bigotry, it seems to me, to
accuse him of attempting to force his particular religion down the throats of others.
All citizens, of all faiths and of no faith,
have the civic interest and the civic obligation to speak out and to work for the common good, including the public morality, of
the nation and the state. I suggest that the
distinction between purely private morality
and public morality, outlined above, may be
of some help in clarifying the issues which
divide us.

PUBLICATIONS
(Continued from page 231)
by any person in seeking religious or spiritual advice or comfort, or as to his advice
given thereon in the course of his professional duties or in his professional character,
without the consent of such person.

would be modern and acceptable to state
legislatures; and (2) That the drafting committee be composed of 15 men to be chosen
as follows: (a) Seven experienced legislative draftsmen: The man most responsible
for the drafting of the priest-penitent statutes in each of the following states: Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts,
South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia,
(b) Four clergymen from major churches,
(c) A trial judge, (d) Two legal educators,
and (e) A teacher from a theological school.

Dean Reese concludes his article by recommending: (1) That some national organization of attorneys sponsor the drafting of
a uniform statute covering privileged confidential communications to clergymen that

